№ 2014/4

The article deals with the problems of corporate governance in business associations with state share.
The author reveals various shortcomings in the current system of state property man-agement. Among them: the deformed structure of the state corporate rights; the vertical of state corporate rights failing to cover the grassroots level; administrative methods of divi-dend policy and unconstructive investment policy of the state regarding business associa-tions with state share.
The efficiency of the management of state corporate rights is considered. It is estab-lished that out of 140 companies that were under the management of the State Property Fund and whose state share in the charter capital exceeded 50 percent, 66 entities (47.1%) were under the bankruptcy procedure. Management of the rest of the business associations with state share was efficient only in 7 companies (11%), satisfactory – in 9 (14%); unsatisfactory – 48 (or 75%), and 18 companies (28.1%) did not work.
A number of measures aimed to improve the management of state corporate rights are suggested. They include: exemption of authorized state bodies of extrinsic functions of operational management of state corporate rights; the delegation of management of controlling stakes to state holding companies (sectoral and cross-sectoral ones) and the State Agency of Ukraine for State Corporate Rights and Property; passing state-owned shares that are not in demand by buyers to charter capitals of specially created state corporate investment funds (SCIF) in exchange for shares of such SCIFs with subsequent transfer of these assets to the management of professional asset management companies (AMCs) for sale or management; application of the general procedure of calculation and payment of dividends to corporate rights owned by the state, implementation of "golden share" in corporate governance practices of privatization objects with state-owned shares; and giving state companies the right to make additional share issue amounting to no more than 33% of the charter capital in order to attract private investment in the internal development.

Keywords: share, state joint stock company, state corporate rights, dividend policy, investment policy, control block of shares, Supervisory Board, privatization, national joint stock company, state-owned holding company